

76

NEPTUNE

UNCLASSIFIED

HQ. 82nd AIRBORNE DIVISION

ARO-469

IN ONE SHEET ONLY
COPY NO. 76
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REG. NO. 1023

US ARMY
2nd May 1944

MAP GSGS 2738 FRANCE
V250 000 SHEET 83 + B
ANNEX 1b (a)
To FPO:6

BY AUTHORITY OF
CG 82nd A/B Div.
INITIALS _____
DATE 2nd MAY 1944


ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE ON COTENTIN PENINSULA

(SEE ALSO WEEKLY ORDER OF BATTLE
MAPS PUBLISHED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS)

OFFICIAL

JACK
G-2

RIDGWAY
COMMANDING



UNCLASSIFIED

NEPTUNE

76

19 APRIL 44

24 MAR 44

19 APRIL 44

NO COVER

UNCLASSIFIED

ST. MERE
EGISE
617-224 1014



LA HAYE
DU PUIS

84
20

HQ 82ND A/B DIV-

ARO 469 U.S. ARMY
2 MAY 1944

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RECAST
BY INQUIRY OF
CG 82- A/B DIV.
INITIALS
DATE 2 MAY 1944
SHEET 3 OF 4 SHEETS

ANNEX 1^(C)
TO
F.O. 86

MAP G565 4250-FRANCE 1/50,000
SHEETS 6E5 AND 6E6

STATUS OF AREA SUBJECT TO
INUNDATION OF RIVER DOUVE

FROM SORTIE R/482 OF APRIL 19 1944
PHOTOS 3034-38, 4055-57, SORTIE R/480A APR 44
PHOTOS 3013-3033, 303-359, 410-413, 4010-4031
3046-3056, SORTIE R/190 OF 25 APR 44 PHOTOS
4025-34, SORTIE R/482 OF 19 APR 44 PHOTOS 4009-4010
SORTIE R/500 OF 24 MAR 44 PHOTOS 3145-47, 417-
450

OFFICER

RIDGWAY
COMMANDING

JACK
G-2

THE OUTLINED AREA IS
SUBJECT TO ARTIFICIAL
INUNDATION THE STATUS
OF THIS AREA AS OF DATES
SHOWN ON THIS OVERLAY

UNCLASSIFIED

9 APRIL 44

L
E
G
E
N
D

HARD CREST CUT UP BY IRREGULAR PATTERN OF NATURAL DRAINAGE DITCHES APPROX. 3-8 FT. WIDE AND NOT MORE THAN 1 FT. DEEP - SOME WATER OR MUD IN BOTTOM OF DITCHES.

SURFACE APPEARS PARTIALLY TO COMPLETELY SATURATED WITH WATER. HOWEVER NO SHEET C WATER ON SURFACE AREA USUALLY CUT UP BY IRREG. PATTERN OF NATURAL DRAINAGE DITCHES APPROX. 3-8 FT. WIDE AND NOT MORE THAN 1 FT. DEEP.

SURFACE HAS THIN SHEET OF WATER, OVER IT, ALTHOUGH NOT INUNDATED.

SURFACE COMPLETELY COVERED WITH WATER, DEPTH OF THIS WATER APPEARS TO BE FROM 3 IN. TO 1 FT.

RECENT AERIAL PHOTO COVERAGE NOT AVAILABLE. REPORTED AS LIABLE TO FLOODING AND MAY BE ASSUMED TO BE AT LEAST PARTIALLY INUNDATED

- DRY SURFACE
- SATURATED SURFACE
- SUPER-SATURATED SURFACE
- INUNDATED
- ASSUMED INUNDATED

BIGOT
NEPTUNE

BIGOT NEPTUNE
UNCLASSIFIED



HQ. 82nd AIRBORNE DIV
AFD. 469 U.S. ARMY
20 May 1944

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REVISED
ANNEX 1^b(3) TO FC #6
MAP-GSES 2758
SHEET NO. 1, 30th PT M31

**COMMITMENT CAPABILITIES OF
MOBILE RESERVES IN 82nd DIV.
OPERATIONAL AREA**

OFFICIAL
JACK G-2
RIGWAY
COMMANDING

Classification changed to
10 OCT 1944
by authority of AC of S, G-2, WDGS
E. S. JOHNSTON
Colonel, Infantry
CUSTODIAN

UNITS	LOCATION	STRENGTH OF ATTACHING UNITS	DIRECTION OF ATTACK	AREAS OF APPROACH	DISTANCE IN MILES	TIME OF ARRIVAL OF MAIN BODY Head of Column Tail of Column	EVALUATION	REMARKS
Schelle Aht (7) Etc	ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE	600 plus (Inf and Arty)	W	Already in area	1	30 Min	Highest order of prob- ability	Anti-paratrope units can be expected to attack immedi- ately after first drop as the unit will have been alerted as the head of column of the 101st A/S Div passes. A coordinated attack would probably be delayed until first light. This unit is likely to be downed by the 101st A/S Div.
CT 243 (7) (243 Div)	ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE	1700? (Probably 1 Regt Inf plus 1 Bn PA, both at 2/3 T/O 1700?)	W	Already in area	1	30 Min	Highest order of prob- ability	The head of column of the 101st A/S Div is on the side of the DOWNS. However, the bulk of the troops are prob- ably on the S side of the DOWNS. Small anti-paratrope units can be expected to attack immediately after the first drop. The main body is not likely to be committed.
CT 243 (7) (243 Div)	LA HAIE DU FOUIS	Probably 1 Bn Inf plus 1 Bn PA, both at 2/3 T/O 1700?	W, N	1. ST SAUVEUR DE PIERRE PONT. 2. THOUVILLE-SAUVEUR DE PIERRE PONT. 3. DOWNS AT 18900.	5-10	30 Min	High order of prob- ability.	The head of column of the 101st A/S Div is on the side of the DOWNS. Small anti-paratrope units are likely to be sent into the area immedi- ately. The main body is not likely to be committed until after daylight reconnaissance.
Unidenti- fied ele- ments of 243 Div	PERIERES- LESSAY	800 (7) Misc Special Troops, possi- bly Div Re- serve Bn	W, N	1. PERIERES-LA HAIE DU FOUIS-ST LO DUHOUVILLE-ST SAUVEUR LE VI- COMTE 2. PERIERES-LA HAIE DU FOUIS-ST SAU- VEUR LE VICOMTE 3. PERIERES-FOUR L'ANNE-ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE	10-20	2 1/2 Hrs	High order of prob- ability	It is not likely that these troops would be committed until after daylight reconnaissance.
Georgian Troops	BRICQUEBES	1 Bn of Inf	W, N	1. BRICQUEBES-ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE 2. BRICQUEBES-FERVILLE-ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE	6-9	2 Hrs	High order of prob- ability	The composition of the troops at BRICQUEBES is not known. They are not likely to be well suited for of- fensive action. Anti-paratrope units should be expected to attack within 45 min after first drop. It is ex- tremely unlikely that an attack in force will be launched until after first light and then by not to exceed one battalion of Infantry.
Mech Hon Units	OUFACEL	2 Bns Mech Inf and Arty, total- ing 1200- 1500	W, N	1. Corridor between ST LO D'OUVILLE and ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE 2. THOUVILLE-SAUVEUR DE PIERRE PONT, DOWNS AT 18900	25-35	3-3 1/2 Hrs	High order of prob- ability	These troops are believed capable of sending strong anti-paratrope units to arrive and attack within 2 hours of the first drop. The main body may move up under cover of darkness but there is very little likelihood of it being committed until after daylight reconnaissance.
SS Goetz Von Ber- lichingen	RENNES Area	18,000 (2 Bns of Tanks Tot- ally 175 tanks)	W, N	1. RENNES-FOUR L'ANNE-GRANVILLE- OUFACEL-ST LO D'OUVILLE- ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE 2. RENNES-FOUR L'ANNE-GRANVILLE- OUFACEL-LESSAY-LA HAIE DU FOUIS-ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE 3. RENNES-FOUR L'ANNE-VILLICOURT- FOUR L'ANNE-FOUR L'ANNE- ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE	97-115	8 Hrs	High order of prob- ability	SS Goetz Von Berlichingen can be committed into the DOWNS Peninsula. If the CARANTIN entrance is blocked commitment is most likely to be up the west side of the Peninsula. It is likely that this division may get re- inforcements coming from the Seventh Army Bn, which has its advanced echelon at RENNES and rear echelon at LAVAL.
352 Inf Div	ST LO- MELIGNY- VIAUX- GASNET	9,000	W, N	1. ST LO-PERIERES-FOUR L'ANNE-ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE 2. VILLICOURT-LESSAY-LA HAIE DU FOUIS-ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE	35-50	3 3/4 Hrs	Possible, but very low order of prob- ability	352 Div is expected to be committed into RENNES area, but considered likely to be committed up west side of Peninsula.
1 SS Pz Corps	ALENCON	Bn of 70 Tanks	W, N	1. ALENCON-DORIGNY-VIRE-ST LO- PERIERES-FOUR L'ANNE-ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE 2. ALENCON-DORIGNY-VIRE-CONTAINVILLE- LA HAIE DU FOUIS-ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE 3. ALENCON-DORIGNY-VIRE-GRANVILLE- LA HAIE DU FOUIS-ST LO D'OUVILLE- ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE	120	2 1/2 Hrs	Possible, but low order of prob- ability	Not likely to be committed into DOWNS Peninsula until D plus 1. It is more probable that it will be committed into the RENNES area. If any are committed up the W side of the DOWNS it is not believed that they will exceed 1 Bn of heavy tanks.
3d Front Div (Air Route)	HUELGOAT Area MILITARY	1500 Paratro. 1500 Gliders	S, W or N	Direct air route to DAs	120 Air Miles	1 to 1 1/2 hours after takeoff depending upon location of DAs	Low order of probability until D plus 2, then high order of prob- ability.	*This Division has been identified in BRITAIN as a ground force and will probably not leave until the order of battle has clarified. However, it has anti- factory departure fields in its area. The most likely departure fields are at RENNES, LAVAL, and SAINT-SERGE.
3d Front Div (Land Route)	HUELGOAT Area	10,000	W, N	1. HUELGOAT-FOUR L'ANNE-GRANVILLE- OUFACEL-ST LO D'OUVILLE- ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE 2. HUELGOAT-FOUR L'ANNE-GRANVILLE- OUFACEL-LESSAY-LA HAIE DU FOUIS-ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE 3. HUELGOAT-RENNES-FOUR L'ANNE- VILLICOURT-FOUR L'ANNE- FOUR L'ANNE-ST SAUVEUR LE VI- COMTE	200-220	1 1/2 Hrs	High order of prob- ability.	on the open ground 3 miles W of LA HAIE DU FOUIS or on the beach between CONTAINVILLE and LESSAY. The prob- ability of strong parachute drops in the immediate vic- inity of the 352 Division area is remote because of the relative strength of the opposing A/S forces. The possibility of parachute drops of small raiding and distraction parties in the 82 nd Airborne Division area is high.
5th Front Div	Vicinity of NANCY and TROYES	1500 Paratro. 1500 Gliders.	S, W or N	Direct air route to DAs	250 Air Miles	2 1/2 to 3 hours after takeoff depending upon location of DAs	Low order of probability until D plus 2 and then high order of prob- ability.	This is a newly formed division and there is little known about it. A probable employment for these troops would be to rush them up as reinforcements, landing in areas as indicated above for 3d Front Div.

HAZE


(5) 8 1

NOTE: 1. Each unit has been considered individually and has been located from record or order to move. This allows for 1 1/2 hrs to get equipment ready, etc. In the case of units close to 82nd A/S Div area, this would normally be assumed unless stated otherwise. In the case of larger units 1 1/2 hrs. have been allowed between receipt of order and first movement of main body.
2. The road network would prohibit the simultaneous northward movement, past the ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE, of more than one division, or its equivalent.
3. Speed: Wheels 15 MPH, tracks 10 MPH; all units are considered mobile.
4. All enemy troops will be at a high state of alert beginning late in the evening of D-1, because of the approach of the assault troops.
5. Delays caused by bombing raids and bridges are not considered in the calculations.
*Total gliders and jump converted transports available in the west are approximately 1500 paratrope and 1500 glider troops. The number of transport aircraft is probably 100.
In an emergency, crash transport landings in suitable areas might be resorted to.

76

3-14

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Red Hachures: Sheet Flooding
 Red Circles: Saturated

HQ 82nd A/B DIVISION
 APO 769
 27 MAY 1944
 S. Army

Sheet 1 of 2 Sheets
 Copy 76 of 100 Copies
 Reg. No. 1350

Map: CS 5 4 397 F
 Scale 1:50,000
 Widths & Depths of River and
 Streams in 82nd A/B Area

LEGEND

2-4 Denotes width
 of water
 under bridges.
 SOURCES:
 Eng. Design File F+L
 and Aerial Photos 1942-44
 (Latest Satellite Dated 8 May 1944)

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Classification changed to
 16 OCT 1944
 by authority of AC of S, G-2, WDGS
 by E. S. JOHNSTON
 Colonel, Infantry
 CUSTODIAN

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~~SECRET~~ BIG OT-NEPTUNE



THE LOWLANDS BEHIND BRIDGE HAS BEEN FLOODED, BUT NOW SEEMS TO BE DRYING RAPIDLY. INUNDATION NOW APPEARS VERY SHALLOW AND SKEWY.

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IRIGATION DITCHES 3-5 WBE

IRIGATION DITCHES 5-5 WBE

HQ. 28 AB DIV
A.P.O. 469 US ARMY
27 MAY 1944

PROPERTY OF
CG 28 AB DIV.
INITIALS 281
27 MAY 1944

SHEET 76 2 SHEETS
COPY IN 100 COPIES
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ADDITION No 1 TO ANNEX 1c (2) TO FO No 6
MAP - G. 1:25,000, FRANCE, SCALE 1/25,000
SHEETS 51/10 NE, NW 31/20 SE, SW
WIDTHS AND DEPTHS OF RIVERS AND
STREAMS IN 28 AB AREA

RIDGWAY
COMMANDER

UNCLASSIFIED

LEGEND


- 24 DENOTES WIDTH
- (+) DENOTES DEPTH OF RIVER
BENEATH BRIDGE
- SOURCES
- 24 POSSIBLE FUEL PUMP
- 24 POSSIBLE FUEL PUMP
- 24 POSSIBLE FUEL PUMP
- 24 POSSIBLE FUEL PUMP

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BY AUTHORITY OF
CG 82, AB DIV.
INITIALS:
DATE: 21 MAY 44

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Location changed to
10 OCT 1944
AC of S, G-2, WDGS

S. JOHNSTON
Lieutenant, Infantry
CUSTODIAN

--- RCN LIMIT FOR INF TROOPS
--- BOUNDARIES OF AREAS FOR MECH. RGN.

Alger 1 d
to
FO c
By CG 82 AB Div.
250 400, U.S. Army,
20 May 1944

RECONNAISSANCE
SCALE: FRANCE 1/50,000, 3305 4820, Sheets 584, 625 & 4,580, 625.

1. GENERAL:
a. Aggressive 24-hour run will be initiated by prent and glider Infantry units as soon after landing as possible.

b. Essential elements of information will be kept foremost in mind in all run whether or not mentioned in orders initiating it. In absence of specific missions, aggressive run to procure essential elements of information will be maintained by all units in their respective zones without orders from this Headquarters. Initial division essential elements of information are listed in paragraph 2, Annex 1 (Intelligence) to FO c.

c. Contact once established with units equivalent in size to battalion of INF, or a company of tanks will be maintained.

2. REPORTS:
a. Location of any minefields and of any supplies of mines will be reported to this Headquarters by fastest means possible.

b. Spot reports will be forwarded in accordance with paragraph 4, Annex 1 (Intelligence) Standard Operating Procedure, Intelligence, dated 26 February 1944.

c. Reports will be reported to this Headquarters in the least practicable time following completion of mission.

3. OBSERVATION POINTS:
a. Division: (High power telescopes available after landing at night, Force H). Initially on Hills 110 (1885) and 90 (1893). This will not preclude use of those points by units.

b. Units: To be reported through intelligence channels as established.

4. BUILD-UP OF NEW ASSOCIATES:
a. Initial: Foot patrols of prent units.
b. 1st Lift, Force B: Emergency only - 8:30 AM from Div. HQ.
c. Not earlier than 1800 D-Day: 1st Lt, Tr B, 4th Cav.
d. 2d Lift, Force B: 22nd 1/2 Div Man Plat (-).
e. 3d Lift, Force B: Foot patrols, 88th CBI Inf.
f. Not earlier than afternoon D+1: Tr B, 4th Cav (less 1st Plat.)
g. 4th: 1st Cav Co, 89th TD Bn.

5. RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS:
a. 88th CBI Inf -- As indicated on overlay, with special attention to:
(1) By activity observed on Hills 121 (1885) and 121 (1887).
(2) Condition of marshes and swamps in area, including condition of ground, width and depth of channels tributary to Douve R, possible crossings for wheels, tracks, foot troops.
(3) Width, depth, possible crossings for wheels, tracks, foot troops over DOUVE R in area.
(4) Indications of any attempt to bypass to east.

b. 89th TD Bn -- As indicated on overlay, with special attention to:
(1) Width, depth, possible crossings for wheels, tracks, foot troops over DOUVE R in area and over DOUVE R.
(2) Condition of bridges over DOUVE R in both areas 1885.

c. 88th CBI Inf -- As indicated on overlay, with particular attention to:
(1) Condition of marshes and swamps in area, including condition of ground, width and depth of channels tributary to Douve R, possible crossings for wheels, tracks, foot troops.
(2) By activity observed on Hills 121 (1885) and 121 (1887).
(3) Indications of any attempt to bypass to east.

d. 89th TD Bn -- As indicated on overlay, with particular attention to:
(1) Condition of marshes and swamps in area, including condition of ground, width and depth of channels tributary to Douve R, possible crossings for wheels, tracks, foot troops.
(2) By activity observed on Hills 121 (1885) and 121 (1887).
(3) Indications of any attempt to bypass to east.

e. 89th TD Bn -- As indicated on overlay, with particular attention to:
(1) Condition of marshes and swamps in area, including condition of ground, width and depth of channels tributary to Douve R, possible crossings for wheels, tracks, foot troops.
(2) By activity observed on Hills 121 (1885) and 121 (1887).
(3) Indications of any attempt to bypass to east.

attempt to

a. 88th CBI Inf -- As indicated on overlay, with special attention to:
(1) Movement of any of reserves from LA HAYE DU PUITS -- BARKVILLE SUN MAN PLAT.
(2) Any movements from direction of reserves.

b. 89th TD Bn -- As ordered by Div Hqs.

c. 1st Cav Co, 89th TD Bn -- As ordered by CG, 82 AB Div.

d. 1st Cav Co (less 1st section), scheduled to arrive by glider 1800 D-Day; 2d Plat of 1st Cav Co, scheduled to arrive not earlier than 1800 D-Day; 3d Plat, 1st Cav Co (less 1st Plat), scheduled to arrive not earlier than afternoon D-Day. All are prepared on arrival to initiate run of area in priority sequence overlay, with special attention to:
(a) By defenses, forces area of BARKVILLE SUN MAN PLAT.
(b) Hill 50, (1885), including possible by defenses and suitability of hill as observation post.
(c) Suitability of area west of LA HAYE DU PUITS -- or LA BARKVILLE -- highway for cross-country movement of trucks and wheels.

(d) In area 2
(a) By movements from direction of reserves and from BARKVILLE SUN MAN PLAT.
(b) Hill 121 (1887), including possible by defenses and suitability of hill as observation post.

(c) In area 3
(a) By movements from direction of reserves and from BARKVILLE SUN MAN PLAT.

(b) Contact with main force advancing west.

(c) In area 4
(a) Movement of troops from main force and 89th TD Bn Division.
(b) Contact with main force advancing west.

(d) In area 5
(a) Movement of troops from main force and 89th TD Bn Division.
(b) Contact with main force advancing west.

(e) In area 6
(a) Movement of troops from main force and 89th TD Bn Division.
(b) Contact with main force advancing west.

(f) In area 7
(a) Movement of troops from main force and 89th TD Bn Division.
(b) Contact with main force advancing west.

(g) In area 8
(a) Movement of troops from main force and 89th TD Bn Division.
(b) Contact with main force advancing west.

(h) In area 9
(a) Movement of troops from main force and 89th TD Bn Division.
(b) Contact with main force advancing west.

(i) In area 10
(a) Movement of troops from main force and 89th TD Bn Division.
(b) Contact with main force advancing west.

(j) In area 11
(a) Movement of troops from main force and 89th TD Bn Division.
(b) Contact with main force advancing west.

(k) In area 12
(a) Movement of troops from main force and 89th TD Bn Division.
(b) Contact with main force advancing west.

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HAZE

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